Does It Really Matter?  Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era by Graber, Mark A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 75 Issue 2 Article 12 
2006 
Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era 
Mark A. Graber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 675 
(2006). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss2/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era 
Cover Page Footnote 
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of Government, University of Maryland, 
College Park. Much thanks to Ran Hirschl, Mark Tushnet, and the usual crowd of suspects. Special thanks 
to James Fleming for including me in this marvelous symposium. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss2/12 
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM
DOES IT REALLY MATTER? CONSERVATIVE
COURTS IN A CONSERVATIVE ERA
Mark A. Graber*
Gerald Rosenberg's influential The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Reform? sharply distinguished between the constrained and
dynamic view of judicial power. The constrained view, a version that is
held by most political scientists and a few prominent law professors, insists
that litigation is a poor means for bringing about progressive social reform.
Proponents of this view insist that judges rarely disagree with elected
officials and have little capacity to implement those decrees that do diverge
from electoral preferences. Courts, they claim, "can do little more than
point out how actions have fallen short of constitutional or legislative
requirements and hope that appropriate action is taken."' The dynamic
view, favored by most law professors and some political scientists, regards
courts as more effective promoters of progressive political change.
Proponents of the dynamic view believe that Americans enjoy "the world's
most powerful court system," one that "protect[s] minorities and defend[s]
liberty, in the face of opposition from the democratically elected
branches." 2 To the despair of many liberals, 3 Rosenberg's study concluded
that American practice provided more support for constrained courts.
"[A]ttempts to use the courts to produce significant social reform," he
insisted, were "mostly disappointing." 4 Such judicial decisions as Brown v.
Board of Education5 and Roe v. Wade6 had little impact on political policy
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of Government,
University of Maryland, College Park. Much thanks to Ran Hirschl, Mark Tushnet, and the
usual crowd of suspects. Special thanks to James Fleming for including me in this
marvelous symposium.
1. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 3
(1991).
2. Id. at 2.
3. See Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 3-4 (1996).
4. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 336.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and may have even weakened the political movements necessary to secure
integrated education and widely available legal abortion. 7
These findings, which outraged many legal liberals during the early
1990s,8 may provide progressives in law schools with some solace during
the decades to come. Three years after The Hollow Hope was published,
the Rehnquist Court began striking down federal laws at unprecedented
rates. 9 Conservative judicial majorities found new First Amendment,10
Tenth Amendment, 1  Commerce Clause, 12  and state sovereignty 13
limitations on federal power. Congressional authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment was sharply curtained. 14  The same
conservative majorities imposed constitutional limits on state power to
adopt affirmative action policies, 15 forbid invidious discrimination, 16
increase the political power of formerly disenfranchised minorities, 17
regulate land use, 18 prohibit religious proselytizing in public schools, 19 limit
commercial advertising,20 and restrict campaign finance.21  The most
conservative Justices on the Rehnquist Court, Justice Clarence Thomas in
particular, consistently urged the conservative majority to increase its
conservative activism. 22 Justice Thomas's opinions and recent scholarship
7. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 42-201.
8. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley
and McCann, 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 761, 767-76 (1992).
9. See Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to
Modem Judicial Conservatism 40 (2004).
10. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm., 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
11. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
12. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
13. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
14. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
15. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
16. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
17. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
18. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992).
19. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
21. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2229 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mark
A. Graber, Clarence Thomas, in Biographical Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court: The
Lives and Legal Philosophies of the Justices 548, 548-52 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006).
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produced by a new generation of conservative constitutional thinkers 23 call
on the U.S. Supreme Court to expand these existing conservative
constitutional precedents, 24 and find new constitutional limitations on
government power grounded in the Second Amendment, 25 the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 26 the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article 1,27 and the Spending Clause of Article 1.28 The two most recent
judicial appointees, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel A. Alito,
seem sympathetic to these judicial and intellectual trends. 29 Assuming that
liberals are unlikely to gain the electoral victories necessary to move the
Roberts Court to the left over time, 30 the best progressive hope may be that
conservative courts have no more capacity to promote conservative social
change than Rosenberg insisted liberal courts have to promote liberal social
change.
This essay explores the likelihood that conservative federal courts in the
near future will be agents of conservative social change. The following
pages assess whether conservative Justices will support more conservative
policies on some issues than conservative elected officials are presently
willing to enact and whether such judicial decisions will influence public
policy. This essay touches only tangentially on three other important
questions concerning judicial capacity in a conservative age. The first is the
continued vitality of litigation as a strategy for achieving liberal social
change, or at least maintaining liberal precedents, at a time when the federal
courts have largely been packed with movement conservatives. The second
is the probability that conservatives on the federal bench will sustain and
legitimate conservative federal and state policies that a more liberal court
might declare unconstitutional. The third is whether future conservative
litigation campaigns will promote conservative policies, regardless of any
legal success, by mobilizing activists and helping forge conservative
political identities.3' Instead, the focus is strictly on whether the Roberts
23. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
355 (2004).
24. See supra notes 10-22.
25. See David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment,
29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 827, 851 (2002); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793, 810-11 (1998).
26. Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 877, 928 (2004).
27. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 158-89.
28. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 1911 (1995).
29. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286
(3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting); Seth Rosenthal, Fair to Meddling: The Myth of the
Hands-Off Conservative Jurist, Slate, June 27, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2144202/.
30. See Mark A. Graber, Rethinking Equal Protection in Dark Times, 4 U. Pa. J. Const.
L. 314, 342-45 (2002); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 647, 680-85 (2003).
31. For claims that liberal litigation campaigns have had this impact, see Michael W.
McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (1994);
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Court is likely to effect conservative social changes that conservatives could
not otherwise bring about through other governing institutions and political
strategies.
Gerald Rosenberg's pathbreaking analysis of judicial capacity to produce
social reform indicates that conservative litigation campaigns must
overcome three constraints to be politically efficacious. The first constraint
is "the limited nature of constitutional rights." 32 "[N]ot all social reform
goals," Rosenberg maintains, "can be plausibly presented in the name of
constitutional rights." 33  Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for
realizing pro-life policies (as opposed to merely overruling Roe) if
conservative Justices who think abortion is immoral nevertheless conclude
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect unborn children. The
second constraint is "the lack of judicial independence." 34  Rosenberg
observes that "Supreme Court decisions. . . seldom stray[] far from what
[is] politically acceptable" in large part because "Presidents ... tend to
nominate judges who they think will represent their judicial
philosophies." 35 Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for downsizing
the federal government if those conservative elected officials who bestow
substantial governmental largess on conservative constituencies are able to
secure judicial majorities that find such conservative pork constitutional.
The third constraint is "the judiciary's inability to develop appropriate
policies and its lack of powers of implementation." 36 The Hollow Hope
points out that "[1]acking powerful tools to force implementation, court
decisions are often rendered useless given much opposition." 37
Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for realizing a color-blind society
if liberal universities find effective means for masking or otherwise
immunizing from constitutional attack affirmative action policies
previously voided by conservative judicial majorities.
These constraints on conservative judicial policy making limit judicial
capacity even when conservatives control the elected branches of the
national government and most state governments. Conservative litigation
campaigns are effective during times of conservative political ascendancy
only when litigation secures more conservative policies than can be
achieved through electoral politics. If conservative elected officials pass a
national ban on abortion, conservatives, at least in the short run, will not
need an activist judicial decision declaring that legal abortion violates the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the unborn. At most, conservatives will
require conservative courts to declare that such laws pass constitutional
see also Thomas M. Keck, From Bakke to Grutter: The Rise of Rights-Based Conservatism,
in The Supreme Court & American Political Development 414, 422-25 (Ronald Kahn & Ken
1. Kersch eds., 2006).
32. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 10.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 10; see also id. at 13.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 10; see also id. at 21.
37. Id. at 21.
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muster under the Fourteenth Amendment or, perhaps, the Commerce
Clause. Pro-life litigation will make a pro-life policy difference only when
conservative courts declare existing pro-choice policies unconstitutional
and those decisions are implemented by officials who had previously been
unwilling to repeal the offending socially liberal laws.
Part I of this essay explores the extent to which conservative policy
demands can be translated into plausible conservative legal arguments.
Rosenberg found that progressive litigators were often, although not
always, able to overcome this constraint on judicial power.38 The same
seems true for conservatives. Important differences exist between
contemporary conservative political agendas and the main lines of
conservative legal argument. Conservatives who lose political battles over
the military budget are unlikely to have such defeats reversed by courts,
given the broad consensus that the appropriate level of military spending is
not a judicial question. Nevertheless, such prominent scholars as Richard
Epstein and Randy Bamett are developing a conservative/libertarian
constitutional vision likely to appeal to many conservative Justices who
share their policy preferences. 39  Conservative Justices interested in
handing down conservative judicial decisions on matters from gun
regulation to home schooling for religious children will not lack for
plausible constitutional arguments.
Part II considers the likelihood that conservative judicial majorities will
be more conservative than conservative electoral majorities. Rosenberg
believed the judicial recruitment process was a significant constraint on
progressive litigation campaigns, given the powerful evidence that elected
officials are able to secure Justices who share their policy preferences. 40
Nevertheless, while the appointment process practically guarantees that
conservative Justices nominated and confirmed by conservative elected
officials will not advance constitutional visions outside the conservative
mainstream, the balance of power among conservatives on the Court may
differ from the balance of power among conservatives in the elected
branches of the national government. Executive control over judicial
nominations is likely to yield a conservative judiciary that sides with
conservative presidents against conservative legislators on questions
concerning the separation of powers. Conservative Justices who are far
more affluent and educated than the average Republican are likely to side
with conservative elites against conservative populists when disagreements
exist within the conservative majority on such matters as deregulation and
torture during the War on Terrorism.
Part III assesses the extent to which activist conservative decisions will
influence public policy. Rosenberg found that activist progressive
38. Id. at 175-77.
39. See, e.g., Bamett, supra note 23; Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain (1985).
40. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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decisions were often ignored by less progressive governing officials.4 1
Some evidence suggests that activist conservative decisions in several areas
of constitutional law are suffering a similar fate.42  Universities have
maintained and adopted hate speech policies that have consistently been
declared unconstitutional by the Court. Hostile judicial decisions have
influenced, but hardly halted, race-conscious programs in government
contracting and university admissions. The conservative attack on
regulation, by comparison, has been more successful. Studies suggest that
judicial activism in Takings Clause cases is inhibiting both unconstitutional
and constitutional land use and environmental regulations. 43  The
constitutional rulings conservative courts hand down, preliminary analysis
suggests, matter less as legal standards that dictate particular results than as
rhetorical resources that influence the willingness and ability of governing
institutions to pay the litigation costs necessary to maintain more liberal
policies.
The overall picture suggests that conservative courts in the foreseeable
future are likely to promote a drift toward libertarianism. Conservative
constitutional commentators have had more success popularizing
constitutional arguments for striking down liberal governmental programs
than constitutional arguments for mandating conservative governmental
programs. The conservative case for limiting eminent domain is far more
developed and diffused among conservative lawyers than the conservative
case for granting Fourteenth Amendment rights to unborn children. The
affluent and well-educated conservatives likely to sit on the federal bench
are economically more conservative than the average Republican voter, but
no more socially conservative. Such judges are far more likely to go on a
crusade against burdensome environmental regulations than issue jeremiads
against communities that adopt same-sex marriage. The evidence at present
suggests that elected officials are more likely to comply with judicial
decisions limiting government regulatory power than judicial decisions
requiring the restructuring of liberal institutions. The slightest hint of
litigation often dissuades localities from enforcing land use regulations, but
those same officials often devise ingenious means for evading judicial
decisions barring most affirmative action programs. The forces accelerating
judicial libertarianism provide some cause for optimism among
progressives committed to privacy rights, who are likely to fare no worse in
courts than in legislatures, and may fare a bit better in the former.
Progressives who believe that "the vigor of government is essential to the
security of liberty," 44 however, are likely to find the Roberts Court to be an
additional irritant while Republicans rule, and a major obstacle to liberal
41. Id. at 35.
42. See infra notes 147-86 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
44. The Federalist No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Stephen Holmes & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes 49-58 (2004).
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reform should the political left establish a better balance of political power
in the electoral branches of government.
I. THE LIMITED NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Conservative courts engage in conservative judicial activism only when
conservative judicial majorities conclude that a conservative policy is
judicially enforceable. This truism contains two potential constraints on
courts as conservative policy makers. First, conservative Justices must
conclude that a particular conservative policy choice is constitutionally
mandated, that governing officials may not select a more liberal alternative.
Judicial proponents of capital punishment, for example, will not engage in
conservative activism if they believe that elected officials may
constitutionally, although unwisely, punish murder by life imprisonment or
less. Second, conservative Justices must conclude that a conservative
policy choice mandated by the Constitution is judicially enforceable. James
Bradley Thayer's influential 1893 essay in the Harvard Law Review
insisted that Justices should sustain any government action that a reasonable
person might think constitutional. 45 Conservative proponents of judicial
restraint who are committed to this logic will refrain from striking down
affirmative action programs they believe are based on a mistaken, but
plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These constraints have not inhibited prominent conservative Justices and
scholars from championing conservative judicial activism in numerous
areas of constitutional law. Conservative majorities on the Rehnquist Court
frequently declared federal and state laws unconstitutional.46 Justice
Antonin Scalia's separate opinions asserted that the Justices were required
to strike down various liberal policies that Rehnquist Court majorities
sustained.47 Justice Thomas would have the Supreme Court overrule the
major constitutional decisions underlying the New Deal.48 Established and
younger conservative scholars are publishing influential essays and books
defending the activist directions charted by Justices Thomas and Scalia,49
and providing constitutional justifications for conservative activism in other
areas of constitutional law.50
45. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893).
46. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
47. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. See infra notes 66, 68-69 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist
Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485 (2002); J. Harvie Wilkinson
II1, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1383 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 23; Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the
Constitution (2d ed. 2006); Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 15-17.
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These conservative legal writings, on and off the bench, have developed
plausible constitutional arguments for striking down numerous liberal
policies. They include the following claims:
1. Various gun control regulations violate the Second and Fourteenth
Amendment.5 '
2. Most, if not all, restrictions on campaign contributions and
expenditures violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 52
3. Restrictions on hate speech violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, as do anti-discrimination laws when applied to much hate
speech in employment settings. 53
4. Restrictions on non-misleading commercial advertising violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 54
5. Racial, gender, and ethnic preferences are unconstitutional,55 except
in prisons and similar institutions.56
6. The First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid government officials
from discriminating against religious groups when administering
government programs. Religious groups have a constitutional right to meet
on public properties open to secular organizations. 57 Religious believers
have the right to compete for government funds on an equal basis with other
persons, even when those funds will be used to pursue religious goals.58
7. The Free Exercise Clause vests religious believers with the right to
opt out of various government programs and be exempt from neutral
government regulations, unless there is a compelling reason to require
adherence. 59  Public schooling, by promoting secularism, may be
unconstitutional. 60
8. Many governmental regulations, land use and environmental
regulations in particular, violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 61
51. See Volokh, supra note 25.
52. See Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 165-
66 (2001).
53. See David E. Bernstein, You Can't Say That!: The Growing Threat to Civil
Liberties from Antidiscrimination Law 11-22 (2003).
54. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 627, 652-53 (1990).
55. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
56. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 524-50 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
58. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726-34 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev.
1919, 1928-29 (2006).
59. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1110 (1990).
60. See Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious Inequality,
1996 BYU L. Rev. 569, 584-85.
61. See generally Epstein, supra note 39.
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9. The Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids government
from condemning property under eminent domain and then transferring title
to a different private owner, even when the government pays just
compensation and when doing so might promote economic development or
other constitutional ends. 62
10. Minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws, and perhaps even laws
forbidding discrimination by private businesses violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 63
11. Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment may only remedy
constitutional violations identified by the Supreme Court.6 4
12. Legal abortion violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
unborn. 65
13. Vague legislative delegations to administrative agencies are
inconsistent with the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution. 66
14. The spending power in Article I, Section 8 is limited to money spent
to further other enumerated constitutional powers. Any conditions on the
receipt of federal funds must be directly connected to the purpose of the
spending.67
15. The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate only activities
that directly affect interstate commerce transactions, not manufacturing,
employee/employer relationships, or noncommercial matters. 68
16. The Necessary and Proper Clause mandates that federal regulations
must have a plain and direct connection to an enumerated constitutional
power.69
Conservative jurists who endorse these constitutional claims are not
inhibited by any theory of the judicial function that compels judicial
restraint in the face of perceived unconstitutional government action. The
conservative generation that called on liberal Justices to exercise judicial
62. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Claeys,
supra note 26, at 928.
63. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 Reg. 83, 84 (1995); Richard
A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 3-9
(1992); Siegan, supra note 50, at 110-21, 318-31.
64. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558-60 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See David W. Louisell & John T. Noonan, Jr., Constitutional Balance, in The
Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives 200, 244-58 (John T. Noonan, Jr.
ed., 1970); James J. Lynch, Jr., Posterity: A Constitutional Peg for the Unborn, 40 Am. J.
Juris. 401, 403-04 (1995).
66. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001) (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 16-17.
67. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Baker, supra note 28, at 1921-24.
68. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-601 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Barnett, supra note 23, at 274-318.
69. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 60-66 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Barnett,
supra note 23, at 158-89.
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restraint 70 is rapidly being replaced by a younger generation of scholars
who are as eager to employ judicial power on behalf of conservative causes
as the previous generation of liberals was to employ judicial power on
behalf of liberal causes. 71  No proponent of Thayer's rule of clear
constitutional mistake now sits on the Supreme Court. 72 The leading
academic proponents of limited judicial power are either liberal law
professors 73 or conservative political scientists who have little influence on
conservative judicial practice. 74 Justices Thomas and Scalia may employ
the traditional rhetoric of judicial restraint when condemning exercises of
liberal judicial activism, 75 but they do not hesitate to use judicial power to
promote many conservative causes.76
The legal constraint on conservative judicial activism, however, is more
powerful than a glance at recent law reviews suggests. Conservative
constitutional agendas are far narrower than conservative policy agendas.
Alexis de Tocqueville may have asserted that "scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
a judicial question," 77 but a review of recent Republican Party platforms
reveals numerous political issues that are not likely to be resolved into
constitutional or judicial issues for the foreseeable future.78  The
conservative constitutional agenda has little to say about foreign policy,
other than a commitment to executive power 79 that will advance
conservative causes only when the national executive is more conservative
than the national legislature. Conservative courts presently lack the
rhetorical materials for fashioning constitutional arguments mandating that
the United States maintain existing troop strength in Iraq or promote a
reduction in tariffs throughout the world. To the extent conservatives are
unable to obtain their major economic initiatives through legislation, there
70. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense of
Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1985) (book review).
71. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for Critics of Judicial
Review, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 354 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and
Conservative Politics, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1139 (2002).
72. See Keck, supra note 9, at 200.
73. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 249-53 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts 134-35 (1999).
74. See Matthew J. Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the
Sovereignty of the People 280 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:
Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 2-4 (1999).
75. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. See supra notes 58, 64, 66, 68-69 and accompanying text; see also Graber, supra
note 22, at 549-52.
77. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 280 (Phillips Bradley & Francis
Bowen eds., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
78. See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville 's Thesis Revisited, 21 Const. Comment. 485, 505-24 (2004).
79. See John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs
after 9/11, at 152-55 (2005).
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is little on their constitutional agenda suggesting that a litigation campaign
might convert political losses into judicial victories. Should President
George W. Bush be unable to convince Congress that additional tax cuts are
necessary or that subsidies for the energy industry should be increased, no
extant strain of conservative constitutional thought provides grounds that
can be invoked to support a judicial decision proclaiming that such policies
are constitutionally mandated.
Law constrains many.. conservative Justices even when academically
respectable arguments support judicial activism on behalf of a conservative
cause. Conservatives dispute the merits of various manifestations of
conservative judicial activism. John Noonan defends judicial activism on
behalf of the unborn,80 but not on behalf of state sovereignty.8' Justice
Scalia seems content to challenge federal powers assumed during the Great
Society, while Justice Thomas wishes to overturn the judicial underpinnings
for the New Deal.8 2 Hardly any prominent conservative has signed on to
Richard Epstein's claim that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
unconstitutional. 83  While some of these disputes among conservative
lawyers reflect different policy preferences, many are rooted in law. Most
conservatives oppose minimum wage laws as economically inefficient.
Prominent conservative scholars have made constitutionally reasonable
arguments that the Court in Lochner v. New York84 correctly held that
maximum hour laws were constitutionally suspect. 85 Nevertheless, the vast
majority of conservative Justices and scholars still maintain that Lochner
was a gross abuse of the judicial power. Justice Scalia, commonly
identified with the Chicago School of Law and Economics,86 recently
referred to the "discredited substantive-due-process case of Lochner v. New
York." 87 The number of conservatives who insist that Roe v. Wade was
wrongly decided is far greater than the number who insist that legal
abortion violates the constitutional rights of the unborn. Scalia spoke for
the majority of conservative jurists when he declared that the "States may,
if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not
require them to do so." 88
Litigation campaigns may enable conservatives to overcome some of
these legal constraints on conservative judicial activism. Conservative
80. Louisell & Noonan, supra note 65, at 244-58:
81. John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with
the States 156 (2002).
82. Graber, supra note 22, at 542, 549.
83. Epstein, supra note 63, at 10.
84. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. See Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought, 75
B.U. L. Rev. 1441, 1442-43 (1995) (reviewing Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a
Complex World (1995)).
87. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690
(1999).
88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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judicial activism on behalf of some conservative causes will provide legal
foundations for conservative judicial activism on behalf of other causes.
Just as Griswold v. Connecticut89 paved the road to Roe v. Wade, so
decisions narrowing the scope of the commerce power may provide crucial
precedents for judicial decisions narrowing the scope of the spending
power.90 Litigation campaigns succeed, in part, by over time providing
politically sympathetic Justices with stronger legal grounds for reaching a
desired conclusion.9 1 This accumulation of precedent would hardly be
necessary, however, if law did not constrain constitutional decision makers.
Just as Justices motivated only by policy preferences would have mandated
that all states adopt minimum wage laws when overruling Lochner, so too
crude judicial behaviorialists are seemingly committed to predicting that a
judicial decision overruling Roe will mandate that all states ban abortion.
Conservative legal victories may foster increased conservative policy
commitments. Some conservative judicial decisions will fashion political
environments conducive to a more conservative citizenry. Just as judicial
decisions sustaining affirmative action were partly responsible for
numerous businesses learning that a racially balanced work force often
improves profits,92 so too may judicial decisions sustaining policies that
stigmatize abortion increase popular support for pro-life policies. The
causation arrow between law and policy preferences runs in both directions.
Scholars studying the Roberts Court are likely to witness how law both
constrains and facilitates judicial activism. Contrary to Tocqueville and the
attitudinal model of judicial decision making,9 3 Justices do not
automatically translate their policy preferences into judicially enforceable
constitutional mandates. No prominent conservative jurist presently thinks
that the Supreme Court should invalidate legislation increasing funding for
stem cell research. Most conservative opponents of legal abortion insist
that the Constitution permits, but does not require, states to prohibit
reproductive choice. Nevertheless, increased conservative judicial activism
is likely to influence both conservative policy preferences and conservative
constitutional understandings. Roberts Court decisions limiting
governmental regulatory power and restricting legal abortion may create
precedents sufficient to convince conservative citizens opposed to
minimum wages and legal abortion that such policies are also
unconstitutional. Such decisions will also help shape a regime that tends to
produce citizens who believe that minimum wages and legal abortion are
undesirable public policies. Indeed, during a sustained period of
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. See Baker, supra note 28, at 1962-78.
91. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated
Education, 1925-1950, at 70-81 (1987).
92. See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 425, 442-
43 (2005).
93. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited 86-97 (2002).
[Vol. 75
2006] CONSERVATIVE COURTS INA CONSERVATIVE ERA 687
conservative ascendancy in all branches of the national government,
conservative political and legal successes are likely to push constitutional
politics far to the right of their present ideological location. The political
and legal decisions that entrenched the New Deal provided crucial political
and legal underpinnings for Great Society programs and Warren Court
decisions that were almost inconceivable in 1932. The political and legal
decisions that entrench Reagan/Bush conservatism may similarly provide
crucial political and legal underpinnings for conservative policies and
constitutional decisions that are presently, at most, mere cocktail
conversation at Heritage Foundation and Federalist Society meetings.
II. JUDICIAL SUPPORT
Conservative Justices engage in conservative judicial activism only when
they support more conservative policies than conservative elected officials
are willing to make. Rosenberg found that this constraint significantly
weakened liberal litigation campaigns. Justices who were aware that, at
best, weak political support existed for integration and reproductive choice
were unwilling to insist on measures mandating immediate desegregation or
requiring public hospitals to terminate pregnancies-policies that would
have significantly increased racial balance in public schools and access to
legal abortion.94 Some evidence suggests that Rehnquist Court majorities
were no more willing to aggressively champion conservative policies that
threatened prominent conservative constituencies. Faced with opposition
from big business and libertarian suburbanites, the Justices refused to insist
on a color-blind constitution95 or overrule Roe v. Wade.96 Nevertheless,
good reasons exist for thinking that on many issues, particularly those of
concern to conservative elites, the Roberts Court may act more consistently
on certain conservative principles than conservative elected majorities.
Conservative litigators wishing to effect broad social impact must
convince conservative Justices to craft policies that conservatives who
control the elected branches of the national government are unwilling to
endorse publicly. American constitutional politics, however, is structured
in ways that apparently privilege judicial restraint rather than judicial
activism. If "the vast majority of federal jurists have been affiliated with a
partisan group and.., have shared the party affiliation of the president who
nominated them," and these "[J]ustices ... bring their politics into the
courtroom," 9 7 then conservative Justices are far more likely to sustain
conservative policies than insist on policies more conservative than elected
officials are willing to make. When conservative majorities in the elected
94. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 74-75, 189-93.
95. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
96. See Sanford Levinson, Redefining the Center: Liberal Decisions from a
Conservative Court, Village Voice, July 2, 2003, at 38, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0327,levinson,45236, I.html.
97. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 143 (2005).
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branches of the federal government act on the same narrow view of federal
power as is shared by conservative majorities in the national judiciary, the
national government does not pass new laws or enforce existing laws in
ways the Justices think unconstitutional. 98 Conservative judicial activism,
in this political universe, seems likely to be limited to striking down liberal
state policies in blue state outliers.99
Other enduring features of American constitutional politics increase the
probability that Justices selected by a relatively enduring conservative
coalition will frequently be willing to act when those elected officials are
not. Elected officials, various political science studies demonstrate,
frequently promote judicial power to resolve difficult policy issues.100
Pushing politically divisive issues to the federal judiciary enables political
leaders to overcome weaknesses in their partisan coalitions, avoid making
decisions on matters that crosscut existing partisan cleavages, and engage in
credit claiming. Keith Whittington observes how "[p]olitical majorities
may effectively delegate a range of tasks to a judicial agent that the courts
may be able to perform more effectively or reliably than the elected
officials can acting directly." 101  Rehnquist Court decisions limiting the
scope of national power under the Fourteenth Amendment 102 enabled
Republican legislative officials to express publicly sympathy for rape
victims, religious minorities, and the disabled, while minimizing
Republican political accountability for the judicial decisions declaring those
legislative efforts unconstitutional. 103 The judicial selection process, while
practically guaranteeing that only conservatives will be appointed to the
98. See generally Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25
J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 17, 26-27 (2000) ("Jacksonian sympathizers on the Taney Court almost
never voted to declare federal laws unconstitutional because Jacksonians in the executive
and legislative branches of the national government almost always successfully prevented
constitutionally controversial exercises of national power from becoming national law.").
99. See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 488-94 (2000)
(noting that Warren Court activism was disproportionately directed at conservative outliers
in an age of liberal political ascendancy).
100. See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism 12 (2004); George I. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity,
Judicial Power, and American Democracy 45 (2003); Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering
Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown 214 (2004); Keith W.
Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme
Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 5 (forthcoming 2007); Paul Frymer,
Acting When Elected Officials Won 't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S.
Labor Unions, 1935-85, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 483, 495 (2003); Howard Gillman, How
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the
United States, 1875-1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 511, 512-13 (2002); Graber, supra note 92,
at 426-27.
101. Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583,
584 (2005); see also Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 41-45 (1993).
102. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
103. See Graber, supra note 92, at 445.
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Roberts Court, also practically guarantees that those conservatives will tend
to favor the presidential wing of the Republican party and conservative
elites whenever disputes arise that divide conservative presidents and
conservative legislators or conservative elites and conservative populists.
The prospects for conservative judicial activism in a conservative era are
as obscured as they are enlightened by constant repetition of Robert Dahl's
famous observation that "it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat
unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the
fashion of Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of Right or
Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite." 1° 4 Dahl
understood that conservative elected officials were unlikely to appoint and
confirm Justices who would side with liberals on those issues that divided
conservatives from liberals. Even when one party controls all elected
branches of the national government, however, the political elite is unlikely
to be a monolith. "'[J]udicial conservatism,"' Eric Claeys correctly
observes, "is not a coherent single project of constitutional
interpretation."' 10 5 Libertarians offer constitutional visions that differ
substantially from those championed by evangelical Christians. Both
frequently advance claims hostile to the constitutional concerns of big
business. The internal divisions within contemporary conservatism and the
Republican Party explain why some members of the present political elite
support enthusiastically, while others merely tolerate, and still others
vigorously oppose, conservative litigation campaigns for Second
Amendment rights, religious exemptions from anti-discrimination rules,
fewer government restrictions on campaign finance, greater respect for
private property rights, and an end to affirmative action. 10 6 The prospects
for conservative judicial activism on these and other issues depend on
whether the balance of power among various conservatives in the elected
branches of the national government mirrors or slightly differs from the
balance of power among conservatives in the national judiciary.
Random selection may explain some judicial activism in conservative
ages. Nine members of the governing majority selected at random are
unlikely to mirror the governing majority perfectly, particularly governing
majorities as diverse as American governing majorities. 10 7  The
arbitrariness associated with small groups provides reasons for thinking
much judicial review will be "noise around zero," offering "essentially
104. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957), reprinted in 50 Emory L.J. 563, 578 (2001);
see also Tushnet, supra note 73, at 134-35.
105. Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist
Court, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 791, 817-18 (2005); see also Young, supra note 71, at 1188-
1209.
106. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
107. Gary Miller & Norman Schofield, Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United
States, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 245, 249 (2003) ("Successful American parties must be
coalitions of enemies. A party gets to be a majority party by forming fragile ties across wide
and deep differences in one dimension of the other.").
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random changes, sometimes good and sometimes bad, to what the political
system produces."'10 8  During the 1920s, the judicial majority was
somewhat more conservative than the national majority. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the judicial majority was somewhat more liberal than the
national majority. The Rehnquist Court was somewhat more conservative
than the national majority on some issues and somewhat more liberal than
the national majority on others. 10 9 These deviations, a statistical analysis
might suggest, are the normal outcome of a very small sample.
Random judicial review offers some hope for conservative and liberal
litigators alike. Given that the present conservative coalition consists of
libertarians, proponents of certain big businesses, suburbanites who like low
taxes, westerners opposed to land restrictions, religious conservatives, and
proponents of the war in Iraq, a very high probability exists that by sheer
statistical accident, some members of the Republican coalition will be
overrepresented in the Supreme Court and others will be underrepresented.
To the extent that religious conservatives are overrepresented, religious
conservative litigators may be able to obtain exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws that conservative electoral majorities will be unwilling
to adopt. To the extent proponents of big business wind up overrepresented
on the Supreme Court, federal environmental regulations and prohibitions
on commercial advertising might be declared unconstitutional. The
downside for (some) conservative litigators is that random fluctuations are
as likely to benefit liberals as conservatives. If, for example, big business
conservatives are overrepresented in the federal judiciary, then conservative
courts may prove quite supportive of affirmative action programs favored
by the Chamber of Commerce. 110  To the extent libertarians are
overrepresented on a conservative judiciary, proponents of gay rights are
likely to have some litigation successes.111
Conservative courts may also make conservative policies that
conservative elected officials privately prefer but for political reasons
would rather not publicly endorse. 112 Conservatives in Congress have the
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to ban affirmative
action. They may prefer, however, that judicial majorities take the political
heat for such a decision. Representatives under great political pressure to
pass campaign finance regulations that they believe are either
unconstitutional or likely to favor political rivals may resolve their
dilemmas by favoring legislation and supporting judicial nominees highly
likely to declare such regulations unconstitutional. Similar efforts to have
108. Tushnet, supra note 73, at 153.
109. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 Geo. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997).
110. See Levinson, supra note 96, at 38.
111. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, 2 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21, 35-37 (2003).
112. The phenomenon of elected officials foisting off political responsibility for making
policies they privately prefer is discussed at length in Lovell, supra note 100; see also
Graber, supra note 101, 63-64.
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one's cake and eat it too may explain why many conservatives supported
the Gun Free Schools Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
Violence Against Women Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, all
the while praising and supporting the federal Justices who declared
unconstitutional crucial provisions of these measures. 1 13 Such symbolic
politics, however, may also promote liberal policy making. Conservative
lawmakers who vote for statutes banning flag burning or obscenity have
also supported judicial nominees who are strong First Amendment
libertarians. 1 14  Some prominent commentators think Republicans are
quietly quite happy that the Supreme Court presently protects a modicum of
abortion and gay rights, thus allowing suburbanites to vote their
conservative economic values rather than their liberal social values. 115
Presidential influence on the judicial selection process provides another
reason why conservative judicial majorities may prove more conservative
than conservative lawmaking majorities. Supreme Court Justices are
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Presidents
typically select Justices whom they believe will provide strong support for
their political program."16  Senators usually confirm all presidential
nominees they believe reasonably qualified and not ideologically
extreme.11 7 Many Senators support judicial nominees whose views they
perceive to be quite extreme when the nominating President is a member of
their party."I 8 Members of the House of Representatives have almost no
say in the process by which the federal bench is staffed. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Supreme Court Justices have historically favored constitutional
visions championed by the presidential wing of the dominant national
coalition when that vision differs from that of the legislative wing of the
dominant national coalition. 119 The Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy Administrations were able to staff the federal courts with liberals
on the issue of race at a time when they were not able to convince the
Democratic Congress to pass major civil rights legislation. The resulting
Warren Court did not mirror the dominant national coalition, but was fairly
representative of those persons who served in the Justice Department during
the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations. 120
113. See Graber, supra note 92, at 445.
114. Seeid.
115. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How Courts Serve America
102 (2006).
116. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 97, at 130-35.
117. See Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover & Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on
Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 525, 530-31
(1990).
118. See id. at 531.
119. See David Adamany, The Supreme Court's Role in Critical Elections, in
Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory 229, 248 (Bruce A. Campbell &
Richard J. Trilling eds., 1980); Graber, supra note 101, at 43-44, 63-64.
120. See McMahon, supra note 100, at 136-37, 198.
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This presidential influence suggests that the Roberts Court will be more
conservative than the present Republican Congress. The Bush
Administration favors more conservative policies than the national
legislature. When, for the past six years, the executive and the legislative
branch of the national government have disagreed, the President has
typically taken the more conservative position. 121 Separation of powers
concerns have become particularly acute when President Bush signs bills
into law. The Bush Administration has issued more than 750 signing
statements asserting that some provision in legislation passed by
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and signed by the
President is unconstitutional. In virtually every instance, President Bush
has indicated that he will not enforce measures more liberal than his
Administration believes appropriate. The objectionable provisions include
bills banning the use of U.S. troops in combat against rebels in Colombia;
bills requiring reports to Congress when money from regular
appropriations is diverted to secret operations; two bills forbidding the use
in military intelligence of materials "not lawfully collected" in violation
of the Fourth Amendment; a post-Abu Ghraib bill mandating new
regulations for military prisons in which military lawyers were permitted
to advise commanders on the legality of certain kinds of treatment even if
the Department of Justice lawyers did not agree; bills requiring the
retraining of prison guards in humane treatment under the Geneva
Conventions, requiring background checks for civilian contractors in Iraq
and banning contractors from performing security, law enforcement,
intelligence and criminal justice functions. 122
Other signing statements declare that the President will not comply with
legislative demands that scientific findings be presented to Congress
uncensored and "refuse[] to honor Congressional attempts to impose
affirmative action or diversity requirements on federal hiring." 123 To the
extent President Bush successfully secures a Supreme Court that mirrors his
conservative constitutional vision rather than that of the Congress, the
judicial majority is likely to declare unconstitutional many laws that his
Administration will not enforce. Such Justices are also likely to support
presidential prerogative not to enforce measures the President regards as
unconstitutional.
The tendency for federal courts to be staffed by legal elites provides a
final reason why conservatives on some issues might be more successful in
court than in electoral politics. Virtually all contemporary Supreme Court
Justices have attended a very prestigious law school and either practiced
121. See, e.g., George C. Edwards III, Governing by Campaigning: The Politics of the
Bush Presidency 171, 198, 206-09 (2006).
122. Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation
of Powers Doctrine 15 (2006).
123. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 75
2006] CONSERVATIVE COURTS INA CONSERVATIVE ERA 693
with an elite law firm or taught at an elite law school. 124 These informal
qualifications for judicial service mean that conservatives on the bench are
likely to be far more educated and wealthier than the average conservative
or Republican voter. Numerous surveys suggest that highly educated,
affluent conservatives are politically different from their less-educated,
poorer peers. 125 For most of the late twentieth century, such persons were
likely to be more economically conservative and more socially liberal than
other conservatives. 126 These differences between elite and mass opinion
help explain why, in both the United States and in other countries, Justices
during the late twentieth century tended to promote both economic and
sexual liberty. 127
Pew Research Center surveys of the American political landscape reveal
changing differences between more affluent, better-educated Republicans
and their less-fortunate peers that may help predict the future direction of
the Roberts Court.128 Researchers found that core Republican voters can be
divided into three groups: Enterprisers, Social Conservatives, and Pro-
Government Conservatives. Voters in two other groups, Upbeats and
Disaffecteds, also vote overwhelmingly for Republican candidates. 129
Enterprisers differ from every other group of voter in two respects. First,
they are much better educated and far more affluent on average.' 30 Their
high socioeconomic status makes Enterprisers far more likely than Social
Conservatives, Pro-Government Conservatives, or any other group of voters
to secure federal judiciary appointments. Second, Enterprisers are far more
committed to limited government and Bush Administration policies related
to the War on Terror than any other group of voters. Substantially higher
percentages of Enterprisers than Conservatives or Pro-Government
Conservatives favor privatizing social security, drilling for oil in the Alaska
wilderness, reducing domestic spending, increasing military spending,
torturing suspected terrorists, retaining the USA PATRIOT Act,
maintaining recent tax cuts, eliminating minimum wages, banning
affirmative action, and foregoing national health insurance. 131 Enterprisers,
however, are no more inclined than other core Republicans to support such
socially conservative policies as banning abortion. 132 Upbeats, the other
group of affluent, highly educated Republican voters, are far more likely
124. See Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S.
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton 44-45 (3d ed. 1999).
125. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Herbert McClosky & Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What
Americans Believe About Civil Liberties 218-19 (1983); Robert Lerner et al., Abortion and
Social Change in America, 37 Soc'y 8, 11-12 (1990).
127. See Hirschl, supra note 100, at 217-20.
128. The Pew Research Ctr. for the Press and the People, Beyond Red vs. Blue:
Republicans Divided About Role of Government-Democrats by Social and Personal Values,
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than other Republicans to favor legal abortion and gay marriage. 133 A
judiciary composed of affluent, highly educated Republican elites, these
findings indicate, will be far more conservative economically than the
average Republican, more supportive of Bush Administration foreign
policies than the average Republican, but no more and perhaps even less
supportive of social conservatism than the average Republican. Such a
judiciary can be expected to take a narrower view than the national
legislature of federal power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but
be no more tempted than any other governing institution to overrule Roe v.
Wade 134 or Lawrence v. Texas. 135
Social conservatives hoping for some judicial activism on behalf of their
causes may be heartened by political science research on elite
polarization. 136 Recent surveys are finding that "political party elites in the
United States have grown increasingly polarized along a single ideological
dimension."'137 Party elites now tend to take more extreme positions than
average citizens on "social welfare, racial, and cultural issues."' 138 One
consequence of this elite polarization is that all governing officials,
legislators, executives, and Justices in a conservative era are likely to be
more conservative than the average voter, even the average Republican
voter. 139 Prominent Republicans are presently far more likely than the
average Republican voter to prefer limited government, oppose affirmative
action, and favor bans on abortion.140 Given the political risks inherent in
pushing programs more extreme than their constituents prefer, Republican
elected officials who are more conservative than their average constituent
have electoral incentives to foist responsibility for pursuing the
conservative revolution on to the federal courts. Jacob Hacker and Paul
Pierson note how Republicans prefer to "Run from Daylight," when making
policies more conservative than the constituents favor. 14 1 This political
strategy entails finding "alternative routes" that typically "throw up fewer
roadblocks and attract less attention" than legislation, making such
practices "especially attractive for moving public policy off center." 142 On
matters as diverse as weakening environmental regulations, banning
affirmative action, and ensuring that religious believers are exempt from
anti-discrimination laws, conservatives in the elected branch of government
133. Id.
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
136. See, e.g., Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite
Polarization, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 619 (2001); Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey &
Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics,
Causes, and Consequences, 9 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 83 (2006) [hereinafter Party Polarization].
137. Party Polarization, supra note 136, at 86.
138. Id.
139. See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and
the Erosion of American Democracy 25 (2005).
140. Party Polarization, supra note 136, at 95-96.
141. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 139, at 71.
142. Id.
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may prefer that the "dirty work" be done by conservatives in the federal
judiciary. Rather than pass legislation securing these ends, Republicans
may prefer staffing the bench with persons who share their more extreme
conservative views but who, not having to seek reelection, are politically
free to make policies more conservative than warranted by public
opinion. 143
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Conservative litigation movements promote conservative causes in a
conservative age only when nonjudicial officials who are unwilling on their
own initiative to enact or implement certain conservative policies will
nevertheless implement those policies in response to judicial decisions. As
Rosenberg demonstrated with respect to liberal constitutional causes,
gaining favorable judicial decisions is merely half the political battle, if
that. Southern conservatives maintained segregated schools long after
Brown v. Board of Education.144 Police officers on the beat, with the help
of sympathetic local judges, frequently ignored Supreme Court rulings
protecting the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of persons suspected of
crimes. 145 Preliminary observations and anecdotes, while providing some
cause for thinking conservative judicial decisions may help facilitate more
libertarian environmental and regulatory policies, also suggest that many of
the same factors that made liberal courts weak vehicles for reforming
conservative institutions when elected officials were unwilling to act are
similarly making conservative courts weak vehicles for reforming liberal
institutions when elected officials are unwilling to act.
John B. Gould's analysis of hate-speech regulations on college campuses
provides a particular note of caution for conservative litigators bent on
changing practices in a largely liberal academy. 146 Conservative litigators
are undefeated in court. Whenever a court has ruled on the constitutionality
of a college speech code, the policy has been declared unconstitutional. 147
The Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, declaring
unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited "plac[ing] on public or
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or
graffiti... which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
143. See Graber, supra note 92, at 445-46.
144. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 52-57.
145. See id. at 304-35.
146. See generally John B. Gould, Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech
Regulation (2005).
147. See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Bair v.
Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 1995), available at
http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm.
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religion or gender"' 148 was widely understood as aimed at campus speech
codes. 149 These legal successes, however, have had very limited practical
impact. Gould's investigation revealed that most colleges retained existing
hate speech restrictions after nearly identical policies were declared
unconstitutional. 150 Far more universities adopted, rather than abandoned,
bans on racist expression, even when those policies failed to survive
judicial scrutiny in other jurisdictions. "[F]ive years after the Supreme
Court spoke on hate speech regulation," Gould documents, "almost half of
American colleges and universities had hate speech policies on their books,
a rise of nearly 30 percent from the time of the Court's opinion."'' The
few universities that abandoned speech codes did so in response to public
pressure, not judicial rulings. Gould found that when institutions rescinded
hate speech regulations, desires to conform to judicial "holdings were not
part of their calculus."' 52  "Their decisions reflected a cost-benefit
calculation," he observes, "with the costs of internal strife and negative
press attention outweighing any benefits that administrators may have
anticipated in the quality of campus life or the expectations for racial,
gender, or ethnic relations at the school."' 53 Significantly, those institutions
that have complied with judicial decisions are "only a handful."'1 54 Gould
concludes, "[a] much greater number ignored, evaded, or directly
challenged the courts' authority."' 155
Affirmative action is a second area in which conservative judicial
victories have not automatically been translated into conservative policy
gains. The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 156 ruled
that affirmative action programs had to satisfy strict scrutiny, a standard
that at the time was thought to be "'strict' in theory, fatal in fact."'1 57 Lower
courts faithfully followed this standard. Conservative litigators who
challenged minority set-aside programs in the wake of Croson almost
always succeeded in having those policies declared unconstitutional by
federal judges. 158 Nevertheless, affirmative action remained vibrant. Local
148. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
149. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American
Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 143, 150 n.34
(1994).
150. Gould, supra note 146, at 5-6.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 156.
153. Id.; see also Donald Alexander Downs, Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on
Campus 16-19 (2005) (noting that pressure from faculty and students, not judicial decisions,
explains why the University of Wisconsin rescinded its speech code).
154. Gould, supra note 146, at 152.
155. Id. at 153.
156. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
157. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
158. Martin J. Sweet, Supreme Policymaking: Coping with the Supreme Court's
Affirmative Action Policies 81 (Apr. 28, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Wisconsin, Madison, Department of Political Science) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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governments refused to reopen previous settlements requiring racial
preferences, even after the Supreme Court indicated that such decrees
would be struck down. 159 Local officials committed to race conscious
measures found means for crafting "policies that deviate[d] from the
judiciary's policy preferences [in Croson] while simultaneously insulating
those programs from litigation."'160 Martin Sweet found that "at least 150
local governments enacted, or at least attempted to enact, revised or adopted
entirely new affirmative action programs in the decade following
Croson."'161 Claims that "elected officials" have "treat[ed] Court decisions
as little more than 'waste paper," ' 162 may be too strong, however. A few
jurisdictions abandoned affirmative action programs in response to Court
decisions, and other programs were scaled down. 163  Still, few
conservatives would point to judicial decisions striking down affirmative
action plans when celebrating judicial capacity to promote conservative
constitutional change.164
Liberal jurisdictions responded to Croson primarily by obtaining
disparity reports demonstrating that past discrimination had influenced the
local market for government construction contracts. 16 5 Sweet notes that
after 1989, more than one hundred local governments procured disparity
studies at costs between $500,000 and $7,000,000.166 Many studies are
"designed to be briefs for MBE [Minority Business Enterprise] programs
and to function as insurance policies designed to discourage litigation." 16 7
These studies did not directly challenge the holding in Croson. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in Croson that better statistical evidence
demonstrating that "nonminority contractors were systematically excluding
minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities" would under certain
circumstances justify "some form of narrowly tailored racial preference." 16 8
Nevertheless, disparity studies were not simply good-faith efforts to satisfy
conservative judicial demands. For both legitimate reasons owing to the
nature of past discrimination and illegitimate reasons owing to the desire to
maintain an unconstitutional minority set-aside, localities took steps to
ensure that the relevant disparity study reached the politically correct
conclusion. 169  Litigants challenging minority set-asides ostensibly
grounded in a disparity study either had to engage in equally expensive
159. See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continued Irrelevance
of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 673, 686 (1996).
160. Sweet, supra note 158, at 23.
161. Id. at 2.
162. Devins, supra note 159, at 681.
163. Sweet, supra note 158, at 16, 106, 111.
164. Devins, supra note 159, at 681.
165. Id. at 685.
166. Sweet, supra note 158, at 49; see also George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on
Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1997).
167. La Noue, supra note 166, at 13.
168. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
169. Devins, supra note 159, at 685; La Noue, supra note 166, at 13-14.
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studies to demonstrate error, or at least hire experts at expensive fees who
would testify against the disparity study. George R. La Noue notes how
even a faulty disparity study would typically "cheer the MBE program
supporters, intimidate the program's opponents, create some useful
headlines, satisfy editorial writers, and perhaps most importantly, add
immeasurably to the plaintiff's costs in litigation."'170
Sweet's study of minority contracting programs in Philadelphia,
Portland, and Miami highlighted other ways in which localities limited the
immediate and long term impact of Croson. Philadelphia was able to
maintain an unconstitutional minority business enterprise program for many
years by engaging in protracted litigation that City attorneys were fairly
confident would be unsuccessful. When, long after Croson, the City's
minority set-aside program was finally declared unconstitutional, the Mayor
responded with a nominally race-neutral spending program that was thought
to have a similar impact on minority contracting with the City.171
Rather than respond to the demands for constitutional color-blindness of
the conservative Justices who decided Croson, Portland developed a new
minority business enterprise program that responded to the quite different
financial demands of the main conservative interest group that was
sponsoring constitutional attacks on minority set-asides in other cities.
Portland's new program retained racial set-asides for some municipal
contracts, but excluded from that program the larger construction contracts
routinely bid on by established firms. 172 Without financing help from these
larger construction companies, smaller majority-owned construction firms
had no capacity to challenge what was clearly an unconstitutional program
by conservative judicial standards.
Miami similarly forestalled litigation in part by limiting implementation
of a minority set-aside to the contracts typically given to small companies
that lack the resources necessary for a lengthy lawsuit against the city. 173
Dade County complied with court orders striking down minority set-asides
in construction by maintaining a black, female, and hispanic business
enterprise program for all county contracts other than construction and
establishing a "Community Small Business Enterprise" for allocating
construction contracts. 174 Minority contractors in Miami are also likely to
benefit from proposals to convert minority business enterprise programs
into geographically based business enterprise programs that provide special
breaks for contractors who live in particular areas. Given the level of
170. La Noue, supra note 166, at 12.
171. Sweet, supra note 158, at 78.
172. See id. at 102-05. Portland further forestalled litigation by hiring as a consultant the
professor most often called as an expert witness by plaintiffs challenging affirmative action
programs. See id. at 93.
173. Sweet, supra note 158, at 113, 128.
174. Id. at 110-15.
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residential segregation in Miami, a program based on geography is not
likely to differ from a program based on race. 175
A similar phenomenon is occurring with other affirmative action
programs, although evidence is frequently anecdotal. Girardeau Spann
notes how institutions committed to progressive understandings of racial
justice for the foreseeable future will likely be able "to secure at least some
of the benefits of racial balance" by "us[ing] race-neutral factors as proxies
for race." 176 Substituting geography for race is proving popular. Even
prominent Republicans hail as constitutional alternatives to affirmative
action programs that guarantee university admissions to any student who
finishes in the top ten percent of their class. 177 The constitutional problem
with such policies is that existing precedent requires strict scrutiny both for
race-conscious measures and for race-neutral measures that were adopted
for the purpose of benefiting or disadvantaging a particular race, 178 and
such programs are openly defended as means for increasing racial balance
in state universities.179 Still, as Spann points out, conservative Justices who
"delve that deeply into the intent of executive or legislative policy-makers"
responsible for race-neutral measures that benefit persons of color, "would
be analytically required to delve just as deeply into the intent lying beneath
all of the facially neutral classifications that American culture presently
uses to disadvantage racial minorities with respect to education,
employment, housing, and political power."' 180 Another popular move is to
substitute diversity for race, making race one element of diversity. As
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger,
181
diversity programs at major universities seem to function similarly to quota
systems. 182 The Court's willingness to discount the relevant evidence
suggests that "Grutter ... can be read to support the proposition that well-
camouflaged racial balancing is constitutionally permissible."' 183
Future conservative litigation campaigns aimed at realizing a color-blind
society are unlikely to produce more conservative policy changes in the
absence of greater conservative commitment to race neutral practices.
Present constitutional doctrine contains many loopholes in part because
important conservative constituencies, such as the Chamber of Commerce
and the military, favor some forms of race preference. As Business Week
has declared, support for affirmative action is "deeply ingrained in
175. Id. at 137.
176. Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 633, 647 (2005).
177. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L.
Rev. 459, 485 (2004).
178. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977).
179. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 297-98 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Spann, supra note 176, at 650.
181. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
182. Id. at 381-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183. Spann, supra note 176, at 652.
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American corporate culture."'184 As long as prominent elites in the
Republican coalition do not share Justice Scalia's abhorrence of racial
classifications, a reasonable probability exists that Scalia's views will not
command a Court majority, even if Republicans are able to replace some of
the more moderate members of the Roberts Court. Republican activists
who could not persuade Reagan and Bush I Administration officials to
rescind executive orders mandating affirmative action 185 are unlikely to be
more successful persuading such officials to nominate to the federal
judiciary only those persons vehemently opposed to any affirmative action
program. Moreover, devising judicial doctrine that does not have loopholes
may be exceptionally difficult. One wonders, for example, whether the
Michigan Law School admissions process at issue in Grutter would have
generated different outcomes had decision makers not been required to
consider race as an element of diversity, but could simply have used their
own best judgment. Similarly, as long as major businesses perceive the
economic value of having a workforce that racially and ethnically resembles
the markets they serve, a high probability exists that judicial decisions
outlawing any form of racial preference will simply drive such practices
further underground.186
Conservatives may have more success transforming conservative judicial
victories into significant conservative policy outcomes when they litigate
property rights. Conventional wisdom among scholars and litigators is that
such cases as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission187 and Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council188 are significantly restraining land use and
environmental regulation, though not necessarily for reasons that appear on
the face of the majority opinions in those decisions. Supreme Court
decisions providing what may seem like fairly minor legal protections for
property holders often substantially increase the litigation costs that
localities must incur to maintain even regulations that federal courts would
probably declare constitutional. J. Peter Byrne notes, "[e]ven when local
governments successfully defend against takings lawsuits, the mere cost of
litigating these claims can be staggering."' 8 9 Unsurprisingly, many local
184. Howard Gleckman et al., Race in the Workplace: Is Affirmative Action Working?,
Bus. Wk., July 8, 1991, at 56; see also Mark V. Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist
Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 233-34 (2006); Devins, supra note 159, at 697;
Thomas M. Keck, From Bakke to Grutter: The Rise of Rights-Based Conservatism, in The
Supreme Court & American Political Development 430 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds.,
2006) (describing "an overwhelming elite consensus in defending the importance of racial
diversity").
185. See Devins, supra note 159, at 688-89.
186. See generally Striking a Balance: EEO, Diversity, and Affirmative Action Before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n (2006), available at
http://www.ceousa.org/pdfs/eeoctestimony.pdf (testimony of Roger Clegg, President and
General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity).
187. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
188. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
189. J. Peter Byrne, Basic Themes for Regulatory Takings Litigation, 29 Envtl. L. 811,
815 (1999).
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officials prefer settlement when their zoning or environmental rules are
legally challenged. The consequence is probably substantial under-
regulation. 190 Affluent Americans are particularly likely to benefit from
judicial decisions that require local governments passing land use and
environmental regulations to meet vague constitutional standards.
"Although the increased litigation costs may favor the government over
small property owners who do not have the resources to maintain a costly
lawsuit," Barton Thompson writes, "the increased expense concomitantly
may favor large property owners over the government."'19
Susan MacManus and Patricia Turner's 1992 survey of municipal law
officers provides generalized support for claims that local governments
refrain from enforcing constitutional land use and environmental
regulations in order to avoid litigating takings lawsuits. 192 Their findings
confirmed that one major cause of the sharp rise in litigation costs
municipalities experienced during the early 1990s was "an explosion in the
non-tradition use of civil rights statutes ... to include cases involving such
areas as zoning and land development."' 193 Poorer municipalities reported
that defending environmental regulations was eating away at the local
budget. 194 Local officials responded to this litigation crisis primarily by
foregoing projects they thought constitutional. MacManus and Turner
found that "81.4 percent [of all officers surveyed] acknowledged they
settled at least some of their 'winnable' cases just to save money."'195 Some
jurisdictions settled "over half of their cases to save money." 196
These conservative litigation successes paradoxically suggest that more
conservative judicial decisions in regulatory cases may have diminishing
public policy returns. Preliminary evidence indicates that official decisions
to enforce regulations are as much based on the comparative ability to pay
litigation costs as beliefs about whether the regulation at issue will survive
judicial scrutiny. 197 If this is correct, property holders with the capacity to
litigate need only a constitutional standard strong enough to avoid having
190. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151, 1176 (1997).
191. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law
and Director, Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford Law School, Learning to Love
Penn Central: The Lessons of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Address at the 5th Annual
Conference on Litigating Regulatory Takings Claims, Berkeley, California (Oct. 10-11
2002), quoted in Jordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity and Takings Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court Advances Land Use Planning in Tahoe-Sierra, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y
J. 33, 61 n.181 (2002).
192. Susan A. MacManus & Patricia A. Turner, Litigation as a Budgetary Constraint:
Problem Areas and Costs, 53 Pub. Admin. Rev. 462, 465, 467 (1993).
193. Id. at 465, 467; see also Andrew Blum, Lawsuits Put Strain on City Budgets, 10
Nat'l L.J. 1, 32-33 (1988).
194. MacManus & Turner, supra note 192, at 467.
195. Id. at 469.
196. Susan A. MacManus, The Impact of Litigation on Muncipalities: Total Cost,
Driving Factors, and Cost Containment Mechanisms, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 833, 842 (1993).
197. See Kahn, supra note 191, at 61.
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their lawsuit dismissed on a motion for summary judgment in order to
secure a favorable settlement with local officials. By comparison,
government officials need only a constitutional standard weak enough to
prevent summary judgment for the property holder in order to forestall
litigation by those without the resources to engage in protracted litigation.
The admittedly sketchy evidence on the different impacts conservative
judicial decisions have had on affirmative action and regulatory policy
highlight the important role willingness and ability to litigate play in
American constitutional politics. 198 Various tiers of judicial scrutiny may
have more influence on legal theory than on political practice. Mere
rationality tests have significant policy consequences when, as seems to be
the case with environmental and land use law, an apparently deferential
legal standard nevertheless enables private parties to avoid summary
judgment, thus increasing the litigation costs that fiscally weak localities
must pay to maintain both constitutional and unconstitutional policies.
Strict scrutiny may have a lesser policy impact when, as seems to be the
case with affirmative action, local officials are willing to pay substantial
litigation costs to maintain putatively unconstitutional policies and are able
to impose substantial litigation costs on parties seeking to challenge their
actions. These differences in willingness and capacity to litigate help
explain and supplement Rosenberg's conclusion that "[c]ourts may
effectively produce significant social reform when other actors impose costs
to induce compliance."' 199 When conservative litigants are able to impose
more litigation costs than liberal officials are willing to pay, the resulting
public policy is likely to be more conservative than mandated by the
Supreme Court. When liberal officials are willing to pay litigation costs
and are able to impose more litigation costs than potential conservative
litigants are willing to pay, public policy is likely to be more liberal than
mandated by the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Whither the Roberts Court
Progressives at present should be more worried about radicals in suits
than radicals in robes.200 The conservative Republicans who presently
control all elected branches of the national government are adopting
programs that most progressives believe transfer wealth from the poor to
the most well-off Americans, degrade an already degraded environment,
weaken national capacity to form crucial alliances in the War on Terror,
198. See Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme
Courts in Comparative Perspectives 17-23 (1998); Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court:
The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making 149-51 (1990).
199. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 33.
200. The phrase "radicals in robes" is taken from Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes:
Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America (2005).
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foster unconscious and conscious bigotry on the basis of race, ethnicity,
religion, and sexual orientation, favor drug companies over the medically
needy, and largely put the government in the hands of large investors. 20 1
The Roberts Court is likely to contribute to this conservative agenda, if at
all, only at the margins. If country-club conservatives continue influencing
the judicial selection process, the Supreme Court in the future may strike
down particularly egregious (and one suspects largely symbolic) restrictions
on abortion and homosexuality.20 2 If libertarians continue influencing the
judicial selection process, certain national environmental laws will be
declared unconstitutional. 20 3  These decisions will have some impact,
particularly if they can be enforced by market mechanisms or impose more
litigation costs than liberal administrators are willing to pay.20 4 Still, when
seen in political context, worrying about the impact of a conservative
Supreme Court in a conservative era is a bit like our worrying about
whether global warming will increase the flooding in our basements.
Progressives probably will not have to worry about the impact of the
Roberts Court should the political left in the near future establish relatively
enduring control over the national legislative and executive branches, and
most state governments. Throughout American history, dominant national
coalitions have consistently triumphed over recalcitrant courts. Justices,
when faced with hostile elected officials, frequently pull their punches. The
Marshall Court began by refusing to challenge the Jeffersonian decision to
repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801205 and ended by finding ways to avoid a
direct challenge to Jacksonian policies toward the Cherokee Indians. 20 6
Governing officials have ignored Justices who have or are likely to declare
cherished policies unconstitutional. President Abraham Lincoln refused to
obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney. 20 7
Members of Lincoln's cabinet and military officers for the next four years
transferred prisoners or refrained from appealing adverse lower court
rulings in order to avoid a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality
of martial law.20 8 Other judicial challenges to popular policies were soon
reversed. The Chase Court's challenge to the constitutionality of legal
201. See, e.g., Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
(2004); Hacker & Pierson, supra note 139; Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science
(2005).
202. See Tushnet, supra note 73, at 149.
203. See supra text accompaying note 61.
204. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 33; see also supra notes 187-97 and accompanying
text.
205. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803); Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson,
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 163-98 (2005).
206. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1 (1831); Mark A. Graber, Federalists or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party
Politics, 12 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 229, 260-61 (1998).
207. See David M. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court 27-36 (1956).
208. Id. at 123-25, 171-73.
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tender lasted one year.20 9 The Hughes Court's challenge to the New Deal
lasted two years.210 When all else fails, jurisdiction may be curtailed.
Congress, by repealing the Judiciary Act of 1866, prevented the Supreme
Court from declaring unconstitutional crucial Reconstruction measures. 211
Jurisdiction was restored shortly after several Republican appointees
replaced Democratic holdovers. 212  Courts in other countries that too
aggressively challenged a dominant national coalition were completely
reconstituted. 2 13
Conservative courts may be more than a small irritant when progressives
first gain control of all national elected institutions. Progressives who come
to power while the Roberts Court sits will likely be forced to spend scarce
political resources combating judicial hostility to their national agenda. The
consequence will likely be that their "majority coalition [will be] diverted
from its program of substantive policies to a quarrel, often inspiring internal
disunity, about issues of constitutional structure and organization." 214 This
"division in both the electoral and the governmental wings of the majority
party over the counterattack on the judiciary," David Adamany points out,
"diminishes the [progressive] coalition's ability to act in concert on other
matters." 215  Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan cost his
Administration crucial political support and time, and may have been partly
responsible for the conservative surge in the 1938 midterm elections. 216
Nevertheless, progressive problems with conservative courts played only a
minor role in the waning of the New Deal. 217 Both history and scholarship
suggest that to the extent progressives successfully establish a durable
electoral majority, their long-run concern is more likely to be staffing a
court that best serves those progressive values than combating a court that
does not.2 18
209. Compare Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), with Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. (12 Wall.) 603 (1870).
210. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), with Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
211. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (12 Wall.) 506 (1868).
212. See Gillman, supra note 100, at 511, 515-17.
213. Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases 187-200 (2003); Ran Hirschl, Beyond the American Experience: The Global
Expansion of Judicial Review, in Marbury v. Madison: Documents and Commentary 129,
142-44 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002).
214. Adamany, supra note 119, at 246.
215. Id.
216. See David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court,
1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790, 839-41, 844-45 (1973); James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The
Lion and the Fox 314-15 (1956).
217. See Bums, supra note 216, at 360-66.
218. See, e.g., Powe, supra note 99; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding
the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (2001); Howard Gillman, Party Politics
and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in The
Supreme Court & American Political Development 138 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds.,
2006).
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Conservative courts are likely to influence public policy significantly
only after progressives secure partial control of the national government.
Divided government throughout the world facilitates judicial policy
making. "The more diffused politics are," Tom Ginsburg observes, "the
more space courts have in which to operate. '2 19 When the executive and
legislature are controlled by two very different majorities, courts that
support legislative constitutional commitments, executive constitutional
commitments, a combination of both, or a middle way, can be confident
that either the legislature or executive will come to their defense should the
branch controlled by judicial losers attack. Ginsburg details how judicial
activism flourished in Taiwan, South Korea, and Mongolia when
government was divided.220 The same is true in the United States. Much
Warren Court activism was rooted in the sectional divisions that divided the
dominant Democratic Party--divisions that encouraged liberal executives
to promote liberal judicial policy making when they could not always rely
on liberal legislative policy making.22 1 Much Burger Court activism was a
consequence of liberal legislators and conservative executives turning to
courts to resolve their policy and constitutional disputes.2 22
The Roberts Court may prove to be quite destructive to progressive
interests during a time of divided government. A conservative Court is
likely to side with conservatives when disputes arise between elected
institutions controlled by conservatives and elected institutions controlled
by liberals. The Roberts Court augmented by one more conservative
appointee is highly likely to interpret narrowly or declare unconstitutional
progressive legislation intended to reign in a conservative President's
efforts to engage in unilateral policy making and rights violations during the
war against terrorism. The same Justices might also insist on approval from
a conservative Congress should a progressive President seek to abolish the
military ban on gay soldiers or mandate by executive order that affirmative
action be practiced in the federal workplace.
Most important, conservative courts are likely to be able to do more
damage to liberal regulatory reforms than liberal courts can do to
conservative regulatory reforms. For the most part, conservatives promote
deregulation. Courts contribute to those efforts even when they announce
fairly weak standards for protecting property rights, because financially
strapped localities often cannot afford to pay the litigation costs necessary
for maintaining constitutional regulations. Progressive regulatory reform,
by comparison, typically requires the well-coordinated efforts between
multiple actors that are very difficult to achieve in a regime where power is
diffused as widely as in the United States.223 To the extent that courts
219. Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 18; see Graber, supra note 101, at 71.
220. See Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 227, 261.
221. See Powe, supra note 99, at 494.
222. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 101, at 59-60.
223. See Mark A. Graber, Social Democracy and Constitutional Theory: An Institutional
Perspective, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1969, 1978-85 (2001).
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merely add to the complexity and expense of that coordination, they are
likely to inhibit significantly progressive efforts to improve the
environment, promote national health care, and redistribute economic
resources. In short, good reasons exist for thinking that Roberts Court
decisions during a time of divided government will do more to prevent
liberal policy making than Warren and Burger Court decisions during a
time of divided government did to promote liberal policy making.
B. Drifting Toward Libertarianism
The Roberts Court, in almost every conceivable political environment, is
likely to make American public policy more libertarian. Independent
judicial capacity to limit government will be relatively minimal should the
present conservative ascendancy endure or be replaced by a durable
progressive majority. The Roberts Court will have a far greater impact
during periods of divided government by siding with the more conservative
branch of the national government against the more progressive branch
when the latter seeks to promote government power to redistribute wealth,
provide universal health care, promote greater social equality, and heal the
environment. 224 This judicial libertarianism is partly rooted in distinctive
features of contemporary constitutional conservatism. Republican elites
consistently place higher legislative priority on cutting taxes than banning
abortion.225 The most prominent conservatives in the legal academy,
Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett, write bold arguments for judicial
activism on behalf of libertarianism and have little affinity for religious
communitarianism. 226 Contemporary liberals exhibit similar tendencies.
Democratic elites fight to death to prevent any law regulating abortion, but
typically cave on welfare issues.227 Other causes of judicial libertarianism,
however, are more rooted in American constitutional practice and more
global aspects of judicial review.
Courts, American courts in particular, tend to push policy in more
libertarian directions for three reasons. First, the Constitution of the United
States has historically been understood to consist of enumerated powers and
limits on government power. The Constitution, most judges and scholars
believe, "is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties." 228 This
common characterization of the Constitution explains why both
conservatives and liberals have emphasized constitutional arguments
against government regulation rather than constitutional arguments
mandating government action. Liberals during the 1960s and 1970s gained
more judicial support when they asserted that the Constitution forbade
224. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
225. See Graber, supra note 101, at 56-59.
226. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
227. See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification ofAmerican Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731, 731-33 (1997).
228. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); see also David P.
Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864, 890 (1986).
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government regulation of abortion than when they asserted that the
Constitution mandated that the poor be supplied with certain basic
necessities. 22 9  Conservatives have more plausibly asserted that the
Constitution forbids government regulation of campaign finance than that
the Constitution mandates protection of unborn children. 230 Second, the
affluent, well-educated citizens who tend to become Justices are more
concerned with freedom from government regulation than government
protection. Ran Hirschl observes how judges throughout the world
typically are allied with secular elites who promote libertarian agendas.
Their decisions protect more marginalized citizens only when doing so is
"congruent with the prevalent conceptualization of rights as safeguards
against state interference with the private sphere." 2 3 1 The country club
Republicans who cast crucial votes on the Rehnquist Court were far more
concerned with limiting environmental regulations than prohibiting
abortion. 232 Their more liberal counterparts were far more committed to a
constitutional right to sexual autonomy than constitutional rights to basic
necessities. 233  Third, judicial decisions prohibiting government action
consistently have had a greater policy impact than judicial decisions
requiring government action. Courts have proven poor vehicles for
requiring schools to integrate or adopt color-blind policies. By increasing
litigation costs and allowing private markets to function more freely,
however, judicial decisions have more successfully protected property
holders from land use regulations and increased middle-class access to safe
abortions.
The legitimacy of judicial review rests on what courts do in practice
rather than on what they do in theory. Whether Justices are more likely
than other officials to interpret the Constitution correctly is contestable, 234
but accumulating evidence demonstrates that judicial review has predictable
policy consequences. Courts have powerful tendencies, particularly when
government is divided, to impede government action, liberal or
conservative, good or bad. Progressives who should not worry much about
the role of conservative courts in a conservative era ought to worry a good
deal about whether courts in general are more inclined and able to promote
229. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 11; Graber, supra note 227, at 74143.
230. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
231. Hirschl, supra note 100, at 218.
232. See Tushnet, supra note 73, at 148.
233. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 125 (1996) (refusing to challenge cases "recognizing that the Constitution generally
confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
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the deregulatory projects generally preferred by the political right to the
regulatory projects generally preferred by the political left.
